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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND DECREE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff, Respondent, Susan Ester Markham, disagrees with the
Defendant-Appellant's Statement of the case in one particular. The Appellant
indicates that the appeal was from the Decree of Divorce entered January 1,
1986 and from an Order Denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial or in the
alternative, Motion to Alter or Amend the Decree entered May 12,1986. The
Appellant's Notice of Appeal states that it was an appeal from the Order of the
Court filed on the 12th day of May, 1986, denying his Motion for a New Trial or
in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree. The Defendant's Notice of
Appeal does not appeal from the Decree of Divorce which was entered and that
aspect of the case is not properly before the Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff basically agrees with the Defendant's Statement of Facts as
contained in his Appeal Brief. However, the Court is referred specifically to the
Decree of Divorce concerning all the property which was awarded to the
respective parties.
The Decree of Divorce between the parties was signed by Judge Tibbs
on December 24,1985, and was filed for record on January 3,1986.
Subsequently, the Defendant filed his Motion for a New Trial or in the
alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree on January 13,1986. The
Defendant's Motion was heard before the Court on the 8th day of May, 1986,
and his Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend
Decree was denied the following day, May 9,1986 and filed May 12,1986.
Thereafter, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal from the May 9,1986, Order
on June 6,1986.
1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant appealed from the Order of the trial Court denying a Rule
59 Motion. Defendant's Brief addresses issues and states that it is an appeal
from the Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff contends that the sole issue on appeal is
whether the lower Court properly denied the Rule 59 Motion. All other issues
relating to the Decree of Divorce are outside the scope of the appeal and
should be discarded. Under Rule 59 the Trial Court properly denied
Defendant's Motion. There was an evidentiary basis for the Court's decision
and the judgment rendered was not plainly unreasonable or unjust. The
resolution of this issue should resolve the appeal.
Plaintiff argues in Point II, that the Trial Court has wide discretion in
ascertaining the value of marital property. The lower Court had ample evidence
of value to reasonably and justly determine those values. The Supreme Court
is bound to accept the lower Court's values, unless there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. Just because there were differences of opinion as to value,
does not mean there was an abuse of discretion where the Court sets the value
of an item of property.
Point III addresses the issue of separate property. Plaintiff argues that
Defendant received all remaining separate property he brought into the
marriage. Defendant also brought additional property into the marriage, which
was consumed during the marriage. The Defendant argues that he is entitled
to a credit for the value of that property. Property distribution must be
determined based upon the assets remaining at the time of the divorce.
Defendant's separate property was consumed during the marriage and no part
of it could be traced to an item of the marital estate. Therefore, he is not entitled
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to any credit for the property so consumed, and the property distribution, as
made, was just and reasonable.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE DEFENDANT APPEALED FROM THE ORDER
DENYING A NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO
ALTER OR AMEND THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND NOT
FROM THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED BY THE
COURT.

The sequence of events in this divorce action indicate that the Decree of
Divorce was entered in January of 1986. The Defendant made a Motion for a
New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree on January
13,1986. This Motion was thereafter heard by the lower Court on May 8,1986.
The lower Court issued its Order on May 9,1986, denying the Defendant's
Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree.
The Notice of Appeal filed on June 6,1986, merely took an appeal from the
Order filed on May 12,1986, denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or
in the alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree. The Notice of Appeal did
not take an appeal from the Decree of Divorce itself.
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to Alter
or Amend Decree was made pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Motion itself does not refer to Rule 59, however, the Defendant
listed four grounds for his Motion, all of which come directly from Rule 59(a).
The Defendant listed as his first ground for his Motion the fact that the Decree
had made an excessive award to Plaintiff. The second ground the Defendant
listed was that the Decree made an inadequate award of property to the
Defendant. The third ground for Defendant's Motion was that insufficient
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evidence was received to support the awards made by the Decree. Finally, the
Defendant alleged an error in law.
The first two grounds come from Rule 59(a)(5) which states:
Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
There is no evidence that the Court made the property division under the
influence of passion or prejudice. The Defendant has referred to no action or
conduct by the Court or during the trial which would justify the relief he sought
by his Motion under rule 59(a)(5).
Defendant's third point, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, is
also unsupportable. The facts concerning the parties' property and valuation
were well outlined during the course of the trial. There were disputes as to the
valuation of the property, however, the Court exercised sound judicial discretion
in ascertaining those values and thereafter dividing the marital estate. The
Defendant does not suggest what additional evidence may have been
presented or should have been presented that would have aided the lower
Court in valuing or dividing the marital estate. The Defendant did indicate that
no specific values were placed upon various household furnishings, other than
the testimony of the Plaintiff that the overall value of the household furnishings
was approximately $2,000.00 and that the parties had paid $800.00 for the
hutch, and $400.00 for the washing machine and dryer. The small items of
household furnishings were divided between the parties. In some
circumstances it would be proper to value each itemized piece of household
furnishings. In the instant case, the Court had a relatively small amount of
household items to distribute and based upon the evidence that was presented,
that being that the entire value of the household furnishings was $2,000.00, it
can only be assumed that the Court made the determination that an individual
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itemization of property and value was unnecessary and that the parties had
received, and as the Defendant assumed in his Brief, "that each party was
awarded approximately one-half the value of those items". Appellants Brief,
pages 4 and 5. The remaining evidence presented to the Trial Court Judge
was sufficient in character and detail to allow the Court to make an informed
decision concerning the division of the marital estate.
The Defendant's fourth point raised in his Motion for a New Trial or in the
alternative a Motion to Alter or Amend Decree was that an error in law had been
made. No error in law was made by the lower Court. The Defendant urges that
a very unequal distribution of the property was made. The facts as found by the
lower Court show in reality that a relatively equal distribution of the parties
property was made. It is of course not incumbent upon a Trial Court to make an
absolutely equal distribution of property in a divorce situation. This Court has
held that a property division consisting of a 60% to 40% split between the
parties is not necessarily inequitable, and that even a wider split is justified in
some situations. See Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982).
The standard of review of an appeal brought, challenging a lower Court's
decision under a Motion seeking a New Trial or Amending a Decree under Rule
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is well outlined in Nelson v. Trujillo. 657
P.2d 730 (Utah 1982). The Supreme Court therein stated:
Where the Trial Court has denied the Motion for a New Trial, its
decision will be sustained on appeal if there was "an evidentiary
basis for the jury's decision
" The Trial Court's denial of a
Motion for a New Trial will be reversed only if "the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust". (Citations omitted), Id. at 732.
The purpose for this Rule is to afford the lower Court maximum latitude
and discretion in ruling upon Motions under Rule 59. See also Lowe vs. Lvm.
103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030 (1982). The lower Court is in the advantaged
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position of having heard the testimony and other evidence presented and is
best suited to evaluate the respective claims of the parties.
There is ample evidence to support the lower Court's decision dividing
the marital estate between these parties. The Court was therefore justified in
denying the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to
Alter or Amend Decree and that decision should now be upheld by this Court.
POINT II.

THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAS WIDE
DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING VALUES OF MARITAL
ASSETS.

In the event this Court looks beyond the scope of Defendant's specific
Appeal and desires to look further into the Decree of Divorce itself, it will be
argued herein that the lower Court's judgment is well substantiated and should
be upheld.
It is undisputed that the lower Court is in a much more advantageous
position than is this Court in dealing with the factual issues which surround the
distribution of a marital estate. This Court must not substitute its judgment for
the lower Court's on the issues relating to the valuation of the marital estate,
unless there appears a clear abuse of discretion. This theory has been
consistently upheld by this Court. This Court has held:
In order to reverse the Trial Court's distribution of property in a
divorce action, we must find that it "worked such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion".
Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), Gibbons v. Gibbons. 656
P.2d 407 at 409.
In Fletcher v. Fletcher. 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), this Court held:
. . . this Court accords considerable deference to the Findings and
Judgment of the Trial Court due to its advantageous position. On
appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of a Trial Court unless
the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the Trial
Court has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles of law.
*

*

*

There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of
properties, it is a prerogative of the Court to make whatever
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disposition of property as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary
for the protection and welfare of the parties. In the division of
marital property, the Trial Judge has wide discretion, and his
Findings will not be disturbed unless the record indicates an
abuse thereof. Jd- at 1222.
Further, in Gill v. Gill. 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), this Court held:
In adjusting the financial and property interests of parties to
divorce, the trial Court is afforded considerable discretion, and its
actions are cloaked with the presumption of validity. Jd. at 4.
In Argvle v. Aravle. 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984), the Court held:
In particular the "(d) determination of the value of the assets is a
matter for the Trial Court which will not be reviewed in the absence
of a clear abuse of discretion", Turner v. Turner. Utah 649 P.2d 6, 9
(1982). 688 P.2d at 470.
In Turner v. Turner, this Court stated:
The parties, as is not uncommon, placed widely disparate values
on the assets to be distributed.
*

*

*

Determination of the value of the assets is a matter for the Trial
Court which will not be reviewed in the absence of clear abuse of
discretion.
*

*

*

A Trial Court's apportionment of marital property will not be
disturbed unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion, Jd- at 8.
See also Sinclair v Sinclair. 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); and
Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986).
The Supreme Court in an equity case does have authority to weigh the
evidence in a divorce action, however, in light of the holdings of this Court, as

P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), is also applicable herein. In that case, the Court stated:
To mount a successful attack on the Trial Court's Findings of Fact,
an Appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the Trial
Court's Findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the
light most favorable to the Court below, the evidence is insufficient
to support the Findings. id- at 1070.
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The Defendant, in his Brief, has attempted to outline to this Court all of
the evidence concerning the widely conflicting opinions as to the value of the
parties' property. As stated in the above cases, it is not uncommon for a Trial
Court to be faced with widely divergent views as to property values. This Court,
however, is adamant in its holdings that a determination of property values lies
within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge. The Trial Court in this instance
made specific Findings of Fact concerning the value of the major items of
property of the parties' marriage, namely the home and the commercial
business. Those Findings of Fact show that the home's value, minus the liens
against the home, left an equity of $31,000.00 and the business value, minus
the liens against the business, had an equity value of $21,000.00. Values as to
other items of property were taken at the trial level, but were not made specific
Findings of Fact. Plaintiff's 1986 Chevy Truck had an estimated value of $500$800.00 (Tr. Page 10, lines 6-8.) Defendant's 1978 Blazer had an estimated
value of $1500.00-$2,000.00 (Tr. Page 11, lines 10-12). Defendant's tools he
was awarded had an estimated value of $7,000.00-$10,000.00 (Tr. Page 15,
lines 2-4). The overall value of the parties' household furnishings was
estimated to be approximately $2,000.00 (Tr. Page 10, lines 14-15).
It is apparent that the lower Court had the assets of the parties well in
mind when it made the distribution of those assets to the respective parties. The
Trial Court had the opinions of the parties, recent appraisals, offers, and current
listings to aid the Court in determining the values of the parties' properties. The
values placed upon the home and business property were determined from
competent evidence taken at the trial level and cannot now be subject to
variation by this Court. The remaining items of property were also equitably
divided between the parties and this Court should not disturb that distribution.
This Court should uphold the lower Court's Findings and affirm the Judgment
8

distributing the property to the respective parties. The lower Court used sound
judicial discretion in fixing values and awarding property to the parties. Such
disti.bu! on is .»! .•r„jl,i,f« iV, ,, IJL.-,I v.i ,,',< »i.-.ou.1.•!<

1

' r distribution does not

constitute a clear abuse of discretion, which would justify this Court in setting
aside either the values placed upon the properties, or the distribution of those
properties.

POINT III.

DEFENDANT RECEIVED THE SEPARATE
PROPERTY HE BROUGHT INTO THE
MARRIAGE

A recent line of Utah cases has '•e^nm.^ 'h,<i >n qk»Kim\: A p^rsrv
should receive the real and personal property that he or she brought into the
marriage or inherited during the marriage. This line of reasoning is of course

has considerable latitude and discretion in adjusting the financial and property
interests of the parties. See Pusev v. Pusev. 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1986);
Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982); Georgedes v. Georoedes. 627
P.2d 44 (Utah 1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), and
Humphries v. Humphries. 520 P 2d 193 (Utah VifA).
The Defendant argues that he should be given credit for $10,000.00
worth of stock and bonds which he originally brought into the marriage and
wnier, ^ n - GMiiL.^qui'mi, ' ^ u i d ^ d and <we proceed-;- uye<< *'> "ie beneu
and his family (Tr. Page 31, line 18 - Page 32, line 5), and further that he should
be given credit for $25,000.00 from the proceeds of the Cobra race car which he
sold during ihw course ol the marriage, $19,000 of which were used to pay the
common debts and expenses of the parties. ^

Pages 27,28). Six-thousand

dollars of the proceeds of the Cobra < •• •

*

the Defendant for his sole use and benefit. (See Appellant's Brief, Page 5).
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/

An underlying principle which the Defendant has failed to take into
account in his reasoning and rationale is that a Court must evaluate the marital
estate at the time the divorce is granted. As stated in Jesperson v. Jesperson:
By the very nature of a property division, the marital estate is
evaluated according to what property exists at the time the
marriage is terminated. & at 328.
The same conclusion was reached in Fletcher v. Fletcher. The
Defendant is arguing that he should be entitled to recoup $35,000.00 which
was admittedly spent on bills and debts and upkeep of the parties and their
family. Those funds are not the asset which he brought into the marriage, nor
can they be traced into any tangible asset existing at the time the marriage was
terminated. In Pusev v. Pusey. this Court was faced with an argument that one
of the parties was entitled to receive pre-marital assets and that the division
made by the lower Court in that case was inconsistent with the decisions of this
Court which had uniformly returned pre-marital assets to the owner-spouse.
Preston v. Preston. Georoedes v. Georqedes. Jesperson v. Jesperson. and
Humphries v. Humphries. The Supreme Court in Pusev v. Pusev stated:
In every one of those cases proof was made by the prevailing
spouse that real property had been purchased with pre-marital
assets, and those assets were awarded to the owner-spouse
before dividing the marital estate. ]& at 3.
In reviewing each of these cited cases it can be seen that the pre-marital
assets awarded to a party as their sole property was indeed the very asset they
brought into the marriage, or an asset directly traceable from the proceeds of
the original asset. These cases simply have no application to the case before
the Court at this time except as to the remaining funds from the Cobra race car
which were awarded to the Defendant and the Model T automobile which was
awarded to the Defendant. It can be seen that the value of those separate items
was not taken into account in valuing the remaining assets of the parties and
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making the distribution as !U j lowor Court did

ihe general rule of returning

separate property to the particular party is not an absolute rule. In Workman v.
Workman, the Court stated:
In some instances, equity will require that each party to a divorce
recover the separate property he or she brought to the marriage.
(Citing Preston v. Preston^. However, that rule is not invariable,
and we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's not
applying it in the circumstances of this case. Jd. at 933.
There is no evidence that any of the property divided by the lower Court
was held or contemplated as separate property or owned exclusively by the
Defendant. As stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation. §881:
. . .In order to overcome the presumption that property owned by
the parties is marital, a spouse must prove that the entire property
was acquired exclusively as non-marital property and that its
character was not subsequently altered by action of the owner.
The rationale behind such a rule is self-evident. Once parties have
married, they routinely join their assets and begin living what is hoped to be ^
life of peace and bliss. It would be incongruous and indeed a fallacy to
presume that parties, once they were married, would maintain properties in a
separate identity

I he presumption is ot course that property owned by the

parties is marital property. Either spouse has an opportunity to overcome that
presumption and show that any particular piece of property is indeed his soul
and separate property

ie authority found in 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and

Separation. §890 may be helpful to clarify this point further. This Section states
in part:
Property which is separate at its inception may lose its separate
characteristic if it is not kept segregated. In other words, where a
spouse who holds non-marital property causes it to be co-mingled
with marital property, or with the non-marital property of the other
spouse, such co-mingled property is presumed to be marital
property, regardless of the status of the title. Specifically, money
brought into a marriage as separate property becomes marital
property when placed in a joint bank account or joint certificate of
deposit with the other spouse. Where marital and non-marital
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property are co-mingled and then exchanged for new property, the
newly acquired asset is marital property regardless of the state of
the title of such asset.
This logic would also apply to the proceeds of any pre-marital asset used
or consumed during the course of the marriage relationship.
The Defendant's Appeal must be dismissed and the lower Court's
Judgment affirmed. Defendant's fundamental dispute as shown in his Brief,
was the division of the equity and real property and improvements between the
parties. (Appellant's Brief, Page 5). The Defendant has not shown, and the
record does not reflect, that any of his pre-marital assets, namely the
$35,000.00 or proceeds from those assets, were used to purchase or improve
the property which was divided by the lower Court between the parties. The
record reflects the fact that those funds were consumed during the course of the
marriage, and cannot now be identified with any asset whatsoever. The lower
Court's distribution of the assets of the marriage was justly and equitably done.
CONCLUSION
The lower Court's Judgment should be affirmed. The lower Court's
denial of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative a Motion to
Alter or Amend Decree under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
a proper Order and was not manifestly unjust or unreasonable in light of the
circumstances of the case. Since this is the only Order that the AppellantDefendant has directly appealed from, the Court should affirm the lower Court's
Judgment and need not address the remaining issues raised in Appellant's
Brief. However, in the event this Court makes a further review of the particular
facts and circumstances of the Decree of Divorce itself, the lower Court's
Judgement and Order of distribution of the property should likewise be affirmed.
The Court made adequate Findings as to the value and extent of the marital
property of the parties. The Court took into account pre-marital assets which

12

were in existence at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered. The Court
distributed the properly in .1 'l...iu and equitable manner. The fact that the
Defendant may have brought certain property into the marriage which was used
and consumed during the marriage, does not give him a rig hi in have the
Decree of Divorce modified or a new trial granted on the grounds that that
contribution was not taken into account. The law would not justify the Court in
giving the Defendant credit for ihor:,e funds win; h were consumed during the
marriage.
The lower Court Judgment should be affirmed in all particulars.
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